ABSTRACT In this paper, to detect non-technical loss (NTL) of meter manipulating/malfunctioning and bypassing at the same time, we propose the intermediate monitor meter (IMM)-based power distribution network model with the concept of unit networks (UNs) dividing the network into smallest and independent networks to analyze the power flow in detail and effectively detect the NTL. We then propose an NTL detection algorithm to solve linear system of equations (LSE) constructed by energy balance analysis with IMMs and the collector, and describe the hardware architecture of IMMs. Simulation results show that the proposed NTL detection algorithm successively detects the honesty of energy consumers as well as the energy loss from bypassing. Furthermore, it is observed the proposed detection framework is time-efficient and detection accuracy is at least 95% when variability of meter reading value is 80%. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-technical loss (NTL) in smart grids, defined as energy that is distributed but not billed mostly due to energy theft (e.g. bypassing 1 and meter tampering, 2 ) has become a major enduring challenge in power delivery industry worldwide [1] . NTL might be more severe in developing countries (World Bank reports over 50% of theft), but it is still a reality in developed countries, too. Overall, utility companies worldwide lose more than $96 billion every year due to electricity theft, and the utility companies (UCs) in the U.S. lose approximately six billion dollars every year due to this problem [2] The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Siqi Bu. 1 It is performed by illegal connection to power lines to bypass energy meters and steal energy directly. It is also called wired hooking or tapping.
2 Manipulating and deceiving energy meter to reduce the registered energy consumption.
despite the legal restrictions on the penalty of $5,000 fine and up to 5 years prison for energy theft [3] .
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) have been trying to detect electricity theft and the smart meters (SMs) have been gradually deployed to modernize current power grids by combining wired/wireless communications and energy metering functions. However, the smart meters are vulnerable to various types of attacks, which may make energy theft easier to commit. For example, root access [4] which manipulates the output of a smart meter and direct hooking/tapping from lines which is unmeasured by the energy meter are the most used method for electricity theft [5] , [6] .
In most cases, the loss of revenue is passed to benign consumers via tariffs by utility companies [7] . Besides, the NTL can affect the quality of electricity supply (infrastructure damage, voltage violation, etc.), accordingly blackouts might occur and public safety might be at risk [8] - [10] . In addition to these, various negative effects by the NTL have VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ been reported in literatures [11] - [15] . Therefore, an in-depth understanding of the adverse effects on NTL and energy theft mechanism could lead to immediate detection when energy theft occurs. With timely NTL detection, it is possible not only to accurately estimate the amount of energy loss, but also to precisely determine the geographical area where the theft occurred.
To overcome the NTL detection problems in view of network-oriented methodology analyzing energy consumption data from meter reading and load flow [1] , Yip et al. [16] , [17] , which are two of the most relevant studies to our paper in terms of estimating the honesty coefficient based on solving linear system of equations (LSE), propose a new anomaly NTL detection framework for evaluating consumers' energy use behavior to identify the areas of possible energy frauds and defective meters. However, detecting the loss from illegal bypassing and smart energy thief who understands conventional detection methodologies to avoid being detected are not considered. Han and Xiao [18] develop a detector called NTL fraud detection which detects NTL fraud with an additional device and a small amount of data. Salinas et al. [19] look into the energy theft detection issue considering user's privacy problem and propose three distributed algorithms for solving LSE using peer-to-peer (P2P) computing. Also, Liu and Hu [20] design a privacypreserving aggregation protocol to collect the total energy consumption of a group of users at a distribution station in smart grids, which shares a similar idea to those works like [21] on privacy-preserving data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Bandim et al. [22] propose a central observer to measure the total energy consumption of a small number of users, and are able to identify all the energy thieves by comparing the total energy consumption with the reported energy consumption from the users. In [4] , an energy theft detection framework with multi-sensor for AMI (AMIDS) was presented to collect the data of malicious behavior of cyber-and host-side network, on-meter anti-tampering sensors, and power measurement-based anomalous consumption detectors with nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM). Leite and Mantovani [23] propose a strategy for detecting NTL that uses a multivariate control chart which establishes a reliable area to monitor the measured variance in traditional power grids.
In view of data-oriented NTL detection using supervised or unsupervised learning to learn special features of occurring loss [1] , Nizar et al. [5] employ a data mining technique known as Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) to classify users' electricity consumption patterns or load profiles. By comparing the results to a database of users' load profiles, the proposed algorithm yields a list of users who could be stealing energy, which we call ''energy thieves''. Nagi et al. [24] propose a similar approach but choose to use genetic algorithms and Support Vector Machine (SVM). Depuru et al. [25] develop a data mining-based scheme utilizing SVM as well. Messinis et al. [26] present a novel concept for detecting NTL based on training an SVM classifier, sensitivity analysis, and breakout detection with solving non-linear power optimization problem. Punmiya and Choe [27] introduce a machine learning (ML)-based gradient boosting theft detector (GBTD) focusing on the feature engineering-based preprocessing to improve detection performance as well as time-complexity. Unfortunately, these techniques cannot also sort out the energy thieves stealing energy by bypassing.
In the above related studies [4] , [16] - [27] , even though the NTL detection methodologies are diversely proposed, there are still unsolved challenges and problems in real fields such as, 1. NTL detection has been studied mainly for meter tampering and defective meter without considering the loss from illegal bypassing or hooking. It is necessary to study for detecting not only the meter tampering and malfunctioning but also bypassing by parameterizing all kinds of NTLs in attack models. 2. It is also necessary to study for the smart energy thief who understands the conventional energy balance analysis-based detection methodology and use malicious strategies which irregularly varies his/her theft rate to interrupt the detection. The overall goal of this paper is to detect all possible NTLs including a) meter tempering b) meter malfunctioning and c) bypassing, and provide an NTL detection strategy with intermediate monitoring meters (IMMs) in neighborhood area networks (NANs) in smart grids. To achieve this goal, we approach through the following steps as the contributions of this paper:
Step 1: We propose a novel power grid model employing the concept of unit networks (UNs) centering on IMMs to detect the loss from bypassing(hooking/tapping) as well as meter tampering/malfunctioning and improve detection efficiency and accuracy. With the unit networks divided into the smallest power distribution network from conventional power grids, we can acquire the more specific and large amount of power consumption data from each branch of electrical poles where the IMM is installed, and closely observe and detect where and how much the NTLs occur. Further, we illustrate one example of hardware architecture and installation of the IMM.
Step 2: We introduce a new attack model by additionally parameterizing the amount of loss from bypassing and use an honesty coefficient representing the ratio of actually consumed power to stolen power. We then formulate LSE to estimate the honesty coefficients for respective consumers based on energy balance analysis with the proposed concept of UNs in power distribution networks. To the best knowledge of the authors, the proposed NTL attack model that simultaneously considers illegal bypassing, meter tampering and defective SMs based on the IMMs in smart grids is first studied.
Step 3: We propose iterative IMM-based NTL detection (IND) algorithm to solve the LSE constructed in
Step 2, and confirm the proposed algorithm is time-efficient with at least 95% of detection accuracy in the simulation. Since the NAN can be divided into the smallest segmented unit networks, it is possible to detect NTL of the entire NAN in a time-efficient manner by performing the IND algorithm in parallel and concurrently for each UN. Furthermore, due to an advantage of concurrent detection, the proposed detection algorithm can have short response time to detect the entire network and effectively detect smart energy thieves who intentionally change his/her NTL rate (theft rate) frequently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe a novel power grid model employing the IMM-based UNs and the NTL attack model considering the bypassing and meter tampering/malfunctioning. In Section III, we propose NTL detection algorithm based on energy balance analysis based on the proposed power grid model considering smart energy thieves. In Section IV, simulation results are presented. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. IMM-BASED ELECTRICAL NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we consider an architecture of the electrical and communications network using IMMs in a NAN [16] , [17] , [28] as illustrated in Fig. 1 . In modern smart grids, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) facilitates the efficient and reliable information exchange with diverse wireless and wired communications. Hence, it is expressed as electrical flow and communication flow overlay each other and are bidirectional [19] . In conventional power distribution systems, utility providers (UPs) generate power and also build distribution stations (DSs) to distribute power to all the consumers, and measure the total sum of energy consumption [kWh] of the NAN using a collector (or a data collector) as shown in Fig. 1 . The smart meter (SM) is installed at the home of each consumer to meter the energy usage [kWh] of the consumer in near-real time in Home Area Network (HAN). The SM enables the automatic transmission of metering data, and the information of energy consumption from all SMs is transmitted to the Meter Data Management System (MDMS) to analyze and detect the energy theft. Then, the consumer receives electricity bills from the utility through the analysis of the energy consumption data.
The collector measures the aggregated power supply, denoted by c t i , from the utility providers to all consumers in the NAN at time t i (i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I }). The SM which is installed in each consumer k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , K } automatically records its power consumption, denoted by p t i ,k , as a function of time interval t i . Specifically, the smart meter reading is recorded at time stamp t i , where the interval is t i − t i−1 . Thus, the sum of all users' real energy consumption in the past sampling period must be equal to the total energy consumption of the NAN, c t i , measured at the collector at time t i . If we do not consider any TL and NTL, we have typical power sum model as [18] , [19] :
The power sum model like (1) has a lot of problems and can be irrational since the sum of the losses due to TL and NTL is not parameterized and considered, and also all loss would be claimed equally for all honest and dishonest consumers. It is known that the electricity bill of a customer can potentially be VOLUME 7, 2019 affected by the energy usage of others because the consumers in the same distribution network promote a cooperation that the community bill is computed based on the total energy consumption, c t i [11] .
A. ATTACK MODEL Therefore, to reasonably reflect the practical power consumption scenario including TL and all possible NTLs in power distribution grids, this paper redefines the power sum model as follows:
where c t i denotes the total energy supplied by the utility companies to all consumers (i.e., K of them) in the NAN, α t i is reduced meter reading due to energy thefts by meter tampering or meter manipulating, β t i denotes the amount of loss from faulty meters in the power grid, γ t i denotes an amount of energy stolen by illegal bypassing (wired tapping or hooking) on power lines, and δ t i represents the technical losses (TLs) mainly due to power dissipation. Therefore, if 
III. NTL DETECTION ON IMM-BASED NETWORK
In this paper, we assume that illegal bypassing as well as malicious meter tampering occurs in order to reflect the energy theft that is actually occurring in real power grids. Since the energy loss from bypassing is not parameterized or separated from that of meter tampering, the loss can be mistakenly recognized that an honest user steals energy by manipulating his/her meter or it is from TL. In this paper, to detect NTL including bypassing as well as meter tampering, we additionally introduce a kind of smart meter, IMMs, known as observer meter, to effectively detect and localize the energy theft as shown in Fig. 1 .
To be cost-effective NTL detection network, the IMM is only installed to branching electricity poles (not relay pole) which is holding two or more power overhead lines as its branches in order to minimize installation and management costs of the IMM.
A. ENERGY BALANCE ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED NETWORK
In this subsection, we describe for energy balance analysis for the proposed IMM-based network which is the basis of the NTL detection methodology. In (2), the parameters for meter tampering, α t i , and defective meters, β t i , can be specifically represented as follows: 
where ϕ A t i ,j (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J }) and ϕ B t i ,l (l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}) is an amount of stolen energy by bypassing in Unit Network-Type A (UN-A) and UN-B, respectively. UN-A and UN-B can be considered as a smallest segmented unit network constituting the entire NAN as shown in Fig. 2 (a) . If we successively develop the NTL detection algorithm for one UN, the algorithm can be extended to detect the entire NAN with tens or hundreds of consumers because the detection is performed in parallel for all UNs. We assume the each UN-A includes two IMMs as a basic configuration (the collector is recognized as IMMs), and each UN-B includes one consumer and one IMM. Also, the meter tampering and the bypassing can occur in the SM of all households and on all power lines, respectively.
For an intuitive understanding of the UNs, we re-design the NAN model of Fig. 1 to the block diagram of Fig. 2 (a) . Also, to precisely detect the energy theft, we can have more information on specific power consumption when the concept of UNs is applied to IMM1 as shown in Fig. 2 (b) :
where ϕ A (a), respectively, c IMM 1,t i and c IMM 2,t i are measure of power consumption at IMM1 and IMM2, respectively, c IMM 1 1 ,t i , c IMM 1 2 ,t i , and c IMM 1 3 ,t i are measured power at the three branches of IMM1 as shown in Fig. 2 (a) ,h t i ,1 = h t i ,1 + 1 andh t i ,2 = h t i ,2 + 1 are the honesty coefficient for SM1 and SM2, ϕ t i ,1 / (1 − ε) is a value reflected in TL corresponding to Bypassing1.
Remark 1:
In the conventional network model, by solving the LSE obtained as time t i flows, it may be possible to obtain the sum of the losses by the hooking, γ t i . However, it is impossible to find the respective bypassing parameters, {ϕ A t i ,j , ϕ B t i ,l }, without IMMs. Our objective is to detect the respective bypassing parameters as well as honesty coefficients in the proposed network of Fig. 2 using IMMs.
B. NTL DETECTION FOR UN-A AND UN-B
In this subsection, we propose IMM-based NTL detection (IND) algorithm to detect and calculate NTLs for meter tampering/malfunctioning, h t i ,k , and bypassing, {ϕ A t i ,j , ϕ B t i ,l }, in the NAN of Fig. 2 (a) (5) and (7), respectively, as follows: [29] , [30] , x (x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}) and y (y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Y}) are the IMM and its branch number monitoring the consumer k, respectively. The hooking for all UN-As, ϕ A t i ,j , in the NAN can be detected simply using (10) . The goal of Step 2 is to find the honesty coefficienth t i ,k and the loss from bypassing ϕ B t i ,k by jointly solving the LSE (11). In order for the matrix X in LSE (11) to have a unique solution, det(A) =p t i ,k −p t i+1 ,k = 0 should hold or the rank of A should be 2 in linear algebra. Therefore, we assume the power consumption readingp t i ,k andp t i+1 ,k should be different in Step 2 to find the unknowns h t i ,k , ϕ B t i ,k , which means the proposed NTL detection method is effective only when the energy thief change the rate of his power consumption (p t i ,k =p t i+1 ,k ). However, this assumption is not tough in reality since there are so many factors that can change the power consumption rate. Turning on and off TVs or even a light bulb can make the rate of power consumption be changed. Note that the noise variance is small enough so that only the rank of (11b) is important in the proposed algorithm design.
We then try to obtain the output, h t i ,k , ϕ B t i ,l , by solving the LSE generated at every time t i+1 . Ifp t i ,k andp t i+1 ,k is measured equally within the boundary of the measurement error e p t i ,k , we may fail to detect NTLs, otherwise detection will succeed. Note that we assume that the meter reading for consumer k ,p t i ,k , for time t i independently varies among the consumers. Thanks to the parallel nature of the UNs in the proposed IMM-based network, the NTL detection can be performed among the UNs with a minimum response time.
Remark 2: In conventional networks that do not introduce the IMM, energy balance analysis should be totally dependent on the collector in the DS. Therefore, in order to obtain the detection result, not only does it require a lot of time to read the meter until the rank has been reached at least as much as the number of consumers in the NAN, but the reliability of the result may not be guaranteed if the energy thief changes their NTL rate during the time to get the rank.
C. NTL DETECTION FOR SMART ENERGY THIEF
In the previous subsection, we proposed a methodology for detecting bypassing (hooking and tapping) and meter tampering in the proposed IMM-based network. The basis of the detection methodology was to analyze the energy balance of the UNs and to capture change in the meter reading p t i ,k over time.
In this subsection, we propose a methodology detecting smart energy thief that uses a malicious strategy which changes his/her honesty coefficient (theft ratio)h t i ,k to make our detection failed by leading the meter reading p t i ,k to be read constantly, although the actual power consumption changes. In other words, the power consumption of the smart energy thief can be freely changed, but it can be difficult to obtain the required rank for detection because it does not change the meter reading. Recently, the methodology of detection based on the LSE has been known through studies such as [16] - [19] , so the above strategy can be reasonably inferred as a way to cheat. To express the malicious strategy in UN-Bs, we have:
t i ,k using the updatedh t i+1 ,k , where θ is the result of solving Eq. (12) as:
step 4) Discard the output of Steps 2 and 3 ifh t i ,k < 0 or ϕ B t i ,k < 0. Furthermore, to improve the reliability of the output of the algorithm, we add the Step 4. After Step 4, we finally determine the honesty of consumer k and confirm whether there is bypassing through the output. Then, we return to
Step 1 with time update (i ← i + 1) to iterate the proposed algorithm. Note that we updateh t i ,k ←h t i−1 ,k and ϕ B t i ,k ← ϕ B t i−1 ,k when the detection fails in Steps 2 and 3. The IND algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 3 with the aforementioned steps and description.
D. HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE OF IMM
In this section, we present an example of the hardware structure and feasibility of the IMM. Fig. 4 shows one example of the IMM installed on the electric pole. Since IMM is aimed at measuring the energy usage of UNs, IMM should be installed in the electric pole, where the electricity is distributed. Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of IMM consisting of a current sensor, analog to digital converter (ADC), micro control unit (MCU), memory, display, wired/wireless communication unit and breaker. The structure of the IMM is similar to that of conventional SMs but there is a difference that multiple current sensors are equipped to measure the power transfer of all electric branches (power lines) in an electric pole. Thus, the IMM should have current sensors as many as the number of branches of the pole. The operation process of IMM is that, firstly, current sensor measures the current on each power line, and it is converted to a digital by ADC to be handled in MCU. MCU calculates and displays the consumed power, and transmits to the MDMS via the communication unit. In addition to measuring power usage, the IMM can transceive control signals to control regional power transmission from MDMS. We can refer to the ''distributed detector'' [31] proposed as a more sophisticated energy meter for monitoring, sampling and communicating in power grids.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the proposed algorithm is evaluated under the IMM-based distribution network illustrated in the topological diagram shown in Fig. 6 . The testing network provides 5 anomalous cases (4 meter tampering and 1 faulty meter) of 20 loads (SM) and 5 bypassing in the NAN. The time interval t i − t i−1 and the TL rate ε are set to half-hour and 10%, respectively.
Figs. 7 and 8 represent calculated honesty coefficients h t i ,k and energy loss from bypassing ϕ t i , respectively, by the proposed IND algorithm for 30 times of meter reading. Only for anomalous cases as setup in Tables 1 and 2 are plotted with real value for comparison. Further, the setup for the honest coefficient is set to vary the honest coefficient in consideration of the smart energy thief. To validate our algorithm, the errors of measurement were included as follows:
where e t i is the white uncorrelated noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 for t i . The probability that the meter reading p t i ,k varies with respect to t i is set to 80%. Though it can be seen that the ''detected'' and ''real value'' are substantially in agreement with each other, the slight VOLUME 7, 2019 differences between them are observed likely due to the injected noise in (14) . Note that the error like a pulse at time t 11 , t 16 and t 25 in Fig. 8 is generated since we assume in the proposed IND algorithm that the amount of bypassing are the same at times t i and t i+1 . Furthermore, although results from Figs. 7 and 8 suggest that the proposed algorithm using the IMM and the collector can successfully detect not only the defective/manipulated meter but also bypassing in the given environment, the performance analysis for detection accuracy in the environment where the probability of change for meter reading varies from 0 to 100% is required.
Figs. 9 and 10 demonstrate the mean error for detected honesty coefficients and bypassing, respectively, for different probabilities of change for SM reading p t i ,k . All curves of the mean error calculated as the absolute value of the difference between ''detected'' and ''real value'' in Figs. 9 and 10 were averaged over 1,000 independent simulations for t i , each of which involved randomly generated noise in (14) . Overall, the larger the real value, the greater the mean error. Also, as the variability of p t i ,k increases, it is observed that the error tends to decrease, which means that the detection accuracy increases. Specifically, it is observed that the detection accuracy is at least 95% for the honest coefficient when variability of p t i ,k is 80%. According to the proposed LSE-based NTL detection methodology, this tendency can be understood that the performance of detection accuracy is improved as the probability of obtaining the rank of LSE increases due to the increase in variability of p t i ,k . As shown in Table 3 , we compared various NTL detection techniques including the proposed IND algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to detect the NTLs of faulty/manipulated meter and bypassing at the same time, we have proposed the IMM-based power distribution network model with the concept of UNs dividing the NAN into smallest segmented unit networks to time-efficiently detect the NTLs. We then proposed the IND algorithm as a solution for detection of the NTLs by solving the LSE constructed by energy balance analysis with IMMs and collector. Simulation results showed that the proposed detection framework is time-efficient and achieves detection accuracy at least 95% when variability of p t i ,k for t i is over 80%. It was also confirmed that it successively detects the honesty of consumers as well as the energy loss from bypassing that cannot be detected by the conventional detection methodology. 
